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ABSTRACT: Technological revolutions affecting state power are
either open or closed. The precursor to the digital age is not the
twentieth century, with state-controlled programs yielding nuclear
weapons, but the late nineteenth century, when tinkerers invented
the radio, airplane, and high explosives—all crucial to subsequent
wars. To avoid strategic surprise, the US government must take a
broader view of how today’s open innovation is changing society,
and adapt.

T

he digital revolution is happening in an open technological context
different from the period when the United States achieved global
ascendancy, and US strategists cannot rely on twentieth-century
frameworks if they want to avoid strategic surprise. Starting in 1993,
the United States deliberately opened maturing information technologies
to globalized commercial development, in effect giving American
competitors and adversaries as much access to advanced technologies as
the United States and its allies had.
The pace of technological development seemingly accelerated as a
result, but this was untrue: it just seemed faster because technologies
interacted in new ways and globally diffused, affecting more dimensions
of human existence, including conflict. Further, this globalization of
commercial development of information technologies happened outside
the US military. The key to success in warfare now is not in direct
technology development: the US military cannot innovate their way out
of an open technological revolution. They must work with, draw from,
and adapt to it.1

Open and Closed Technological Revolutions

Technological revolutions affecting military innovation and
state power can be either open or closed.2 In the twentieth century,
military technological innovation was mainly closed. Crucial new
systems such as nuclear weapons, battleships, jet fighters, or radar were
expensive, rare, and difficult to build, usually supported by long-term
government programs.
1. For further information concerning this argument, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the
People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020).
2. James H. Moor, “Why We Need Better Ethics for Emerging Technologies,” Ethics and
Information Technology 7, no. 3 (2005): 111–19; and Henry Chesbrough, “Open Innovation: A New
Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” in Open Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm, ed.
Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.
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Closed technological innovation requires high levels of specialized
expertise. Military or scientific elites restrict access to advanced weapons
systems through secret programs and security clearances, as well as
copyrights or patents. Governments track the proliferation of highlevel lethal technology and protect programs from each other, as well
as from the broader public. In this context, military technology evolves
by making incremental improvements on existing capabilities, such as
precision-guided munitions, nuclear warhead configuration or size, or
aircraft stealth capability, for example.
Closed innovation practices lead to slow, highly complex, and
proprietary weapons development. The military sets requirements and
drives the agenda, even as defense contractors chase hefty profits. Experts
speak of dual-use capabilities, meaning parallel military and civilian
applications. Over time costs climb, as major military systems—such as
the F-22 Raptor, Arleigh Burke destroyer, or the Trident II intercontinental
ballistic missile—are upgraded to reduce risk, meet demanding new
standards, protect sunk costs, and maintain technological leadership in
known capabilities.
By contrast, in the twenty-first century technological innovation
is mainly open. Open innovation is driven by commercial processes,
not by the military. Because there is popular access to potentially lethal
technology, it affects everyone in society. There is no need to be a nuclear
scientist or engineer to use emerging technologies or even any reason to
fully understand them, because most digital platforms are cheap, userfriendly, and specifically designed to help people experiment. Companies
such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are driving the development
of these technologies and strive, above all, to expand global markets by
drawing users in.
Not everyone who uses a smartphone to guide a simple unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) or drive a robot, for example, understands how
they work, nor do they need to. Personal phones are compact computers
four times as powerful as the one the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) uses to drive the Curiosity rover, the car-sized
robot that landed on Mars in 2012.3 And yet smartphones are extremely
easy to operate and experiment with. Via cheap, accessible software
users can livestream events, send encrypted messages, steal valuable
information, or identify targets with facial recognition technology.
Historical periods of open and closed technological innovation
have different dynamics, and they require different strategic analyses,
terms, and modes of practice to cope with their implications. Open
technological periods encourage tinkerers. Dual use is replaced by multiuse
to reflect a broader range of users developing and experimenting with
emerging technologies—from professionals, to professional consumers
3. Sharon Gaudin, “Your Smartphone is as Smart as the Curiosity Rover,” Computer World,
August 8, 2012, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2505612/nasa--your-smartphone-is-as
-smart-as-the-curiosity-rover.html; and Leslie Horn, “The iPhone Is Literally Four Times
as Powerful as the Curiosity Rover,” Gizmodo, August 6, 2012, https://gizmodo.com
/the-iphone-is-literally-four-times-as-powerful-as-the-c-5932148.
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(or “pro-sumers”), to hobbyists and consumers.4 Instead of proliferating
like nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, these technologies diffuse,
spreading globally as telegraphs, railroads, radios, or automobiles did.5
The challenges presented by nuclear weapons and other high-end
weapons are thus joined by the instability of lethal applications emerging
from democratized technological innovation.
During open technological innovation, individuals and private
groups buy, use, and distribute emerging technologies and in the process
invent new purposes, new forms, and new surprise combinations
of these technologies. They are deliberately designed to be fiddled
with by ordinary people—tinkerers customizing their Apple I and II
computers, college students building semiautonomous quadcopters,
hackers accessing big databases, or hobbyists 3D printing firearms from
online digital files. Sometimes new technologies are combined with
older ones, such as the 2019 Hong Kong protestors using shortwave
radios alongside smartphones. Open technologies facilitate widespread
experimentation, enabling individuals with a wide range of proficiencies
to combine clusters of technologies together and create new forms and
uses, both good and bad—well beyond whatever their original inventors
had in mind.
Open technological innovation has yielded clusters of technologies
including smartphones, UAVs, robotics, CRISPR (clustered regularly
interspaced short palindromic repeats) gene-editing tools, additive
manufacturing, machine learning, and even simple forms of artificial
intelligence accessible to all. The impact and consequences of these
technologies are gradually coming into focus, but taken together they are
just as important to the future of warfare as the 1945 nuclear explosion
in Hiroshima was. The strategies, theories, and approaches developed
during the twentieth century, a period of closed military technological
innovation dominated by nuclear weapons, differ from those needed to
adapt in today’s era of open technological innovation.

War and Technology

Fortunately, we can learn a great deal from earlier periods of open
technological innovation. A review of historical arguments about war and
technology will distinguish those that apply from those no longer useful.
For about the past five centuries, the dominant historical narrative
in the United States and Europe has been about major powers
concentrating increasingly advanced, complex, and lethal systems under
their control, culminating in the awesome destructiveness of nuclear
weapons. Well-known books such as From Crossbow to H-Bomb, the 1962
history of the weapons and tactics of warfare by Fawn and Bernard
Brodie, surveyed major technological developments like gunpowder, the

4. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: William Morrow, 1980); and Eric Von Hippel, “Lead
Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts,” Management Science 32, no. 7 (July 1986): 791–805.
5. Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003).
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development of early artillery, the transition from wooden to iron ships,
and the race between guns and armor.6
The Brodies argued that while the development of weaponry had
been slow for most of history, it gathered momentum in the nineteenth
century, accelerated further into the twentieth century, and culminated
in 1945 with the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.7
In subsequent years, if any proof of the importance of state-controlled
military technology were needed, the US and Soviet capacity to wipe out
millions of people instantly with nuclear weapons provided it.
This centralization narrative was not watertight. European leaders
outsourced their military power to private contractors during the
seventeenth century.8 And the Brodies did not explore instances in
which new military technologies were counterproductive in warfare or
periods when power became more widely distributed, such as in ninthand tenth-century Europe. Their 1973 second edition, penned in the
closing phase of the Vietnam War, expressed concern the conflict had
“probably resulted in a net slowing down in technological development”
and included an insightful discussion about the increasing costs of major
weapons systems.9
But the view military technological innovation drove the evolution
of warfare prevailed throughout the twentieth century.10 In 1989,
historian Martin Van Creveld opened Technolog y and War: From 2000
B.C. to the Present with: “The present volume rests on one very simple
premise which serves as its starting point, argument and raison d’être
rolled into one. It is that war is completely permeated by technology and
governed by it.”11
A focus on states gaining the technological edge vis-à-vis each other
made sense—in many twentieth-century conflicts, advanced technology
did indeed make the crucial difference. The history of the two world
wars loomed large in most studies, as did careful analysis of innovation
between the wars, because how major powers developed and employed
military technology was important to the outcome.
Both academics and practitioners analyzed capital-intensive
programs. Studying strategic bombing, amphibious warfare, aircraft
carrier warfare, and submarines, for instance, they discovered key
insights about why technologies may or may not be employed effectively
for advantage in battle.12 For example, the Germans were the most
6. Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and
Tactics of Warfare, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
7. Brodie and Brodie, Crossbow to H-Bomb, 8.
8. David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9. Brodie and Brodie, Crossbow to H-Bomb, 280.
10. Alex Roland, War and Technology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), 1.
11. Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press,
1989), 1.
12. Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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technologically advanced of any of the combatants at the outset of the
Second World War yet still failed to use radar effectively.
Interservice rivalry, resistance to radar in the Luftwaffe (World
War I flying General Ernst Udet reportedly said, “if you introduce that
thing you’ll take all the fun out of flying!”), abandonment of shorter
wavelength research, and failure to develop effective operational
doctrine all contributed to Germany’s defeat.13 The British lagged
behind the Germans technologically but more than compensated for
the shortfall by the way they wove radar into every aspect of air defense,
partly by necessity as they absorbed withering German air attacks during
the 1940 Battle of Britain. According to Winston Churchill, “it was
operational efficiency rather than novelty of equipment that was the
British achievement.”14
Other human factors also determined how effectively various state
belligerents capitalized on technological advantages. Sometimes military
training made the difference. When the Second World War started, for
example, the United States already had a robust fleet of submarines
capable of long-range cruising; but commanders had been peacetimetrained to attack well-escorted enemy warships and avoid exposure,
training that emphasized stealth and the use of sonar. Consequently,
commanders avoided risky actions that might have revealed their
location such as surfacing to periscope depth where hostile destroyers
or aircraft could detect them.
This training failed during the war, when the Allied mission changed
to attacking fast-moving convoys of Japanese merchant ships who had to
be espied at periscope depth. Harvard political scientist Stephen Rosen
calculated only 31 of 4,873 known US submarine attacks were directed
by sonar.15 Yet most commanders hewed to their instinct to be invisible,
missing target after target, a practice that changed only when more
aggressive younger skippers took over during the war. Thirty percent of
US submarine commanders were relieved for cause in 1942.16
The boom in twentieth-century studies of military innovation,
doctrine, and training especially in the United States and United
Kingdom produced important insights about how human elements
influence military innovation and how new technologies are deployed.
Nonetheless, despite limitations in high-end military innovations also
revealed by these studies, the view that sophisticated military-controlled
technologies were the lynchpin of strategic advantage for states prevailed.
The revolution in military affairs framework that emerged toward
the end of the twentieth century followed this well-established tradition
of favoring military-controlled technologies. It focused squarely on
13. David Pritchard, The Radar War: Germany’s Pioneering Achievement, 1904-45 (Wellingborough,
UK: Patrick Stephens, 1989), 64.
14. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, The Second World War, vol. I (New York: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1948), 140.
15. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991), 136.
16. Rosen, Winning the Next War, 130–47.
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high-end, large-scale capabilities, arguing future technology, specifically
a system of US-dominated information age technologies—precisionguided munitions, surveillance satellites, battlefield command and
communications, networked operations, and other computer-dependent
systems—would virtually remove any guesswork from future conflicts.17
And the overwhelming defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War (1990–91)
seemed to confirm it.
Some strategic thinkers even asserted information technologies
had fundamentally transformed the nature of war by making the
battlefield transparent and controllable. In the words of US Admiral
and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Owens:
“When technology is correctly applied to the traditional military
functions—to see, to tell, and to act—a powerful synergy is created. . . .
Together, these create the three conditions for combat victory: dominant
battlespace knowledge, near-perfect mission assignment, and immediate/complete
battlespace assessment.”18
This line of argument was the logical culmination of theories
gradually developed over decades of US-dominated, closed military
technological innovation. Paradoxically, it was promulgated at the very
time the US government was consciously opening key technologies to
commercial development and global diffusion. In the 1990s, US military
innovation practices began to diverge sharply from US commercial
policy with respect to government-developed technology—a disconnect
that only got worse as the years went by. This is why today’s era of open
technological innovation has matured some 30 years later, and the US
military is neither driving it nor arguably keeping up.

Pandora’s Box

The shift from closed development to open technological innovation
began in 1993, spurred by deliberate US government policy in the postCold War euphoria about a US-dominated new world order.19 Publicly
financed, government-controlled basic and applied research from the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s drove the technological boom of the 1990s,
as research and development funds and tax incentives shifted from the
defense to the civilian industry.20 With federal government support, the
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) became
the Internet. Tax dollars developed the Global Positioning System. The
Google founders continued the development of their search engine
17. See Dima P. Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical
Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 2
(April 2008): 257–94.
18. Bill Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2000), 100 (emphasis in the original).
19. William J. Broad, “Clinton to Promote High Technology with Gore in Charge,” New York
Times, November 10, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/10/science/clinton-to-promote
-high-technology-with-gore-in-charge.html.
20. William J. Clinton and Albert Gore Jr., Technology for America’s Economic Growth: A New
Direction to Build Economic Strength, (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 22,
1993), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED355929.
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with funding from a National Science Foundation grant. All of the
major components of smartphones were derived from US government
programs, including microchips, touchscreens, and natural language
voice activation, such as Apple’s Siri system.21
The contrast may be most starkly illustrated by comparing the
management of the highly secret Manhattan Project, which resulted
in the nuclear bomb in 1945, to the current development of machine
learning artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Private companies,
foremost Microsoft, IBM, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Alphabet
(Google’s parent), now drive AI research. Worldwide spending on AI
research is projected to reach $35.8 billion in 2019, a 44 percent increase
over what was spent in 2018, and is expected to double by 2022.22
The Pentagon has recently established and funded its Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center, but commercial actors like Microsoft, with state-ofthe-art computing power, immense cloud storage and massive data sets
that power new forms of deep learning, have a 10-year lead.23 Meanwhile
technology companies have entirely globalized their operations. In
December 2017, for example, Google announced a new AI institute in
Beijing, stating, “the science of AI has no borders.”24
As the Information Age barrels along, we are embarking on an era
of full automation, autonomy, narrow artificial intelligence and, perhaps
ultimately, artificial general intelligence. Yet most analyses of current
and future threats apply concepts such as deterrence and compellence,
developed during the nuclear revolution. History is indeed relevant,
and the nuclear threat remains; but the scope of strategic and historical
analyses must be further widened, not only beyond formal military
organizations but also to periods predating the current disruptive
moment. The next “big thing” in warfare may well be a bunch of little
things used by ordinary people in new ways.

Lessons from the Nineteenth Century

The last comparable period of open technological innovation
occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century when
globalized industrialization matured in ways that mirror today’s ripening
information age. When innovation processes are open and there is rapid
change, not just war is permeated by technology; all of society is.
During much of the nineteenth century, amateur and professional
scientific communities had no clear dividing line between them. Just

21. Lewis M. Branscomb et al., Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing
World (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992); David Hambling, Weapons Grade: How Modern
Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-Tech World (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005); and Mariana Mazzucato,
The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (New York: Public Affairs, 2015).
22. “Worldwide Spending on Artificial Intelligence Systems Will Grow to Nearly $35.8 Billion
in 2019, According to New IDC Spending Guide,” International Data Corporation, March 11, 2019,
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44911419.
23. Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, Tools and Weapons: The Promise of the Digital Age (New
York: Penguin Press, 2019), 195–7.
24. Fei-Fei Li, “Opening the Google AI China Center,” Google in Asia (blog), December 13,
2017, https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-asia/google-ai-china-center/.
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as today members of the public are free to purchase quadcopters,
build robots, experiment with simple gene-splicing kits, or download
instructions for building 3D printed weapons, 150 years ago the public
could buy wiring kits, chemicals, and explosives at the local hardware
store or through the mail.25 The changes underway then were even more
sweeping than they are today, affecting patterns of human habitation,
transportation, energy consumption, food production, sanitation, and
medicine, and people wanted to understand and participate in them.26
Especially in Europe and the United States, new periodicals began
to appear that explained science in nontechnical terms to a newly literate
public excited about the potential of new technologies. Popular Science
Review (founded 1862) and Nature (1869) emerged out of Britain, for
example, while Scientific American (1845) and Popular Science Monthly (1872,
now called Popular Science) began in the United States, all designed to
serve the enthusiastic layman.
The result was a burst of popular creativity by pro-sumers, hobbyists,
and consumers. For example, in 1867 Alfred Nobel patented the first
stable and safely detonatable high explosive—dynamite—after first
experimenting with nitroglycerin in a backyard shed behind the family
home in Stockholm, Sweden. Italian electrician and physicist Guglielmo
Marconi invented the radio using homemade equipment in the attic
of his Bologna home and patented it in 1896.27 Orville and Wilbur
Wright, bicycle manufacturers operating out of a home workshop in
Dayton, Ohio, designed and built the Wright Flyer, which made the first
sustained, powered flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina in 1903.
Alfred Nobel’s most critical invention, the blasting cap, used one
explosive (mercury fulminate) to detonate another (nitroglycerine), thus
solving a key problem in the evolution of explosives and introducing a
method of detonation ultimately used in everything from artillery to
atom bombs. He also invented ballistite, a more controlled yet powerful
explosive that launched an entire class of munitions and enabled rapidfire artillery. Thus high explosives, radios, and airplanes all resulted
from open technological innovation achieved by and for civilians, at
less than $1,000 each. All were crucial to future military operations,
yet none originated in government-sponsored programs—or arguably
could have done so.
Some inventions also dramatically affected global patterns of
nonstate violence. Nobel’s dynamite set off the first global wave of
modern terrorism, the so-called anarchist wave, which spread to every
continent (except Antarctica), killing or injuring thousands of civilians.28
25. W. W. Huntley and F. M. Robinson, Catalogue of Standard List-Price of Material Used by Railroads
1900 (Richmond, VA: I.N. Jones, 1900), 35.
26. Martin Wolf, “Same as It Ever Was: Why the Techno-Optimists Are Wrong,” Foreign Affairs,
July–August 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/same-it-ever-was.
27. C. Mackechnie Jarvis, “The Distribution and Utilization of Electricity,” in A History of
Technology, Vol. V: The Late Nineteenth Century, 1850-1900, ed. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, Ar. G.
Hall, and Trevor I. Williams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 227–8.
28. Cronin, Power to the People, chaps. 3 and 4.
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The resulting violence included dozens of politically destabilizing
assassinations of presidents, prime ministers, and monarchs, from
Russia, across Europe, to the United States. Newly laid underwater
telegraph cables then spread news of what were called “dynamitings”
throughout the world, in stories packed with graphic details that helped
build the Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst mass-market
print empires in the United States. This wave of violence was propagated
by the worldwide publication of anarchist newspapers and pamphlets. At
the same time, individuals could easily buy dynamite, selling in Oregon
at the time for thirty-six cents per pound, for example.29
By the time Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot on June 28,
1914, a global trifecta of openly accessible lethal technology, new
communications vectors, and the diffusion of individual or small-group
violence was solidly in place—a situation that in some ways resembles
what we face today.

Contemporary Parallels

Innovation with twenty-first-century information age
technologies is driven as much by widespread popular experimentation
and tinkering as by secret development projects and elites holding
high-level clearances. In the same way that the key to understanding
innovation in the years before World War I was not just the
1897–1914 Dreadnought competition between Germany and the
United Kingdom, the key to understanding innovation today is not
just the well-publicized US-Chinese artificial intelligence arms race.
The bigger picture before World War I included global power
politics between states such as Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia,
France, and Britain, but also open technological innovations such
as the civilian use of the telegraph, the invention of steel, the
development of fine machine tooling, the transition from coal to
petroleum, and the creation of stable high explosives. Together these
commercial innovations spawned vast killing machines for which
the European powers were unprepared and had no effective military
responses. Rapid military innovation then happened during the
war through a bloody process of trial and error, but none of the
belligerents had accurately assessed the implications of a preexisting
open technological context, and the cost of learning on the job
was cataclysmic.
Likewise, today’s digital revolution includes a global story
regarding the evolution of future war, centered on changes happening
outside the military. Commercial-sector-driven technology clusters
such as globalized social media, additive manufacturing, widespread
robotics, driverless vehicles, Internet-connected devices, machine
learning, and evolving artificial intelligence are altering how force
can and will be used. Most obviously, popular mobilization and
29. Finn J. D. John, “Dynamite Used to Be a Regular Part of Oregon Life,” Offbeat Oregon,
January 11, 2015.
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psychological operations have profoundly changed through digital
profiling and the weaponization of social media. But avenues of
physical attack are shifting too, as cheap facial recognition tools
democratize assassination and the “Internet of Things” makes
everyone vulnerable to assault. Functions that for centuries required
a well-funded and well-trained army are accessible now to private
actors and individuals—not at the same level of competency, but
good enough to kill and to have widespread political impact.
To adapt, the military must pay closer attention to accessible
open technologies, especially who is using them. Violence is taking
new forms, not just in the hands of authoritarian powers but also
from below, degrading the future effectiveness of the US military in
both state and nonstate contests. Initiatives such as the Third Offset
Strategy, a well-funded, admirable effort to develop capabilities such
as military robotics and human-machine teaming, actually employ
the wrong historical analogy.
Unlike the Cold War period when the United States employed US
technology—nuclear weapons and precision-guided munitions—to
offset Soviet geographic and numerical advantages, today the United
States must respond in a technological context where threats and
opportunities arise from surprise commercial advances not developed
for the military and not under centralized state control.
Monitoring accessible open technologies, however, does not
mean ignoring the actions of potential state adversaries. In the past
20 years, Chinese technological espionage alone has been harmful
to American interests and those of Allies and partners. “In effect,
by stealing and exploiting U.S. and Western technical secrets, they
have been able to level the technological playing field with the U.S.
Joint Force, in some key military capabilities, in little less than two
decades—a relative blink of an eye in a peacetime, long-term strategic
competition,” former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work
and defense analyst Greg Grant rightly observed.30
But it is also worth noting deliberate US decisions about
privatizing and sharing digital technologies during the technoutopian 1990s leveled the playing field by making Internet-assisted
economic espionage possible for China. China and other countries
are stealing American and allied secrets because years ago we made
it extremely easy for them to do so. From the vantage point of
the 1990s, one person’s espionage is another person’s open access
to information.
The question, now that we have opened this Pandora’s Box, shared
basic technologies, and fostered a dynamic era of open innovation, is
how can the US military better adapt to the consequences and come
out ahead?
30. Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy
with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2019), 7.
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How to Succeed

The United States is still the world’s leader in the most important
technologies for civilian and military purposes, including robotics
and artificial intelligence. Maintaining this leadership position
involves reversing the disastrous 1990s divergence between US
commercial policy and US government innovation policy.31
First, we must reconceptualize our understanding of military
technological innovation to reflect the reality of the commercially
driven, open technological context. Second, we must reorganize
around new strategic concepts, models that adopt a whole-of-society
approach and jettison neat, state-on-state frameworks. Commercial
tech companies are now much more wealthy and powerful than many
states. Finally, we must work with, educate, train, and reward the
personnel necessary for winning the wars of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, when surprise destabilizing threats are as likely to emerge
from small groups and individuals or even private commercial
entities, as they are directly from major powers—who already use
them as proxies.
Technology is no longer supporting the centralization-of-force
narrative that defined the Western nation-state.32 At the moment, the
entities centralizing technology and power are the tech companies,
and authoritarian actors such as China and Russia. Enhanced
government surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic further
strengthens authoritarian state power. The United States and some
of its adversaries still have massive nuclear capabilities, but these
arsenals are joined by diffuse, digital-based technologies many
people can access. Nuclear deterrence remains crucial for managing
nuclear weapons but insufficient to counter the threat posed by the
panoply of twenty-first-century technologies changing our societies.
The US military must prepare for an era where professional
armies are indistinguishable from proxies, and nonstate actors
develop unanticipated lethal capabilities. Cyber contests, economic
espionage, Internet device hacking, and theft of intelligence happen
below the level of interstate war yet pose an ongoing cumulative
threat. And our domestic political polarization offers weaknesses for
adversaries to exploit.
Democratized technologies favor contests of harassment,
disruption, and attrition that erode our strength. Building smart
regulations that minimize the risks of popular emerging technologies
such as shoring up security standards for Internet-connected devices,
increasing resiliency to online psychological operations, improving

31. Ash Carter, “Technology and Public Purpose: Reflections on the Dilemmas of Tech and
Possible Solutions,” (annual Ernest May Memorial Lecture, “Technology and National Security:
Maintaining America’s Edge,” Aspen Strategy Group Summer Workshop 2018, Aspen, Colorado,
August 3, 2018).
32. Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); and
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
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privacy standards, building a legal structure for personal data rights,
and preventing wholesale hacking of databases, is as much a national
security imperative as a law enforcement challenge.
Second, thriving in an era of open technological innovation
demands working with and encouraging tinkerers and pro-sumers,
those driven by curiosity and technological creativity both in and out
of the military. In the nineteenth century, Orville and Wilbur Wright
did not want to join the military, nor did Alfred Nobel or Guglielmo
Marconi. They wanted to invent, create, and innovate independently.
Alternately, when government-sponsored programs were driving
cutting-edge research, people like J. Robert Oppenheimer, Edward
Teller, and Enrico Fermi left academe and went to the Manhattan
Project to invent, create, and innovate.
They wanted to make a difference in the war effort, but they
also knew Los Alamos was a center of pioneering nuclear research.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, all of the services, along
with government-funded think tanks like RAND Corporation, drew
many of the best scientists because the most advanced research,
especially in physics and engineering, was government funded and
led. 33 This is not the situation now.
It is too late to recapture cutting-edge digital innovation in
traditional military or government organizations on any large scale.
Innovation within the military or even defense innovation is the
wrong way to think about it. It is also inherently impossible, as well as
undesirable, to try to coerce commercial companies to serve national
military aims, as they do in authoritarian countries like Russia and
China. But we have time to adapt. Innovation actually happens
pretty slowly: the military can gain advantages by appealing to the
ideals of tech innovators and offsetting their economic risk. Most
tech company employees and independent entrepreneurs sincerely
want to serve the public good.
Commercial tech companies such as Microsoft, Google, or
Facebook should remember the long history of how paradigmshifting, brilliant innovations are used—often regardless of
inventors’ intent. In July 2019 Microsoft invested $1 billion in
OpenAI, which seeks to create artificial general intelligence rivaling
the human brain.34 Amazon and Google are also avidly competing
in this area: AI is integral to Amazon’s e-commerce and Google
owns DeepMind. Absent clear ethical principles and restraints and
a deep understanding of history, the US commercial sector is just as
likely as the US military to inadvertently set off an arms race where
humanity loses.

33. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); and
Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (1983; repr., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
34. Taylor Telford, “Microsoft Invests $1 Billion in OpenAI to Pursue Artificial Intelligence
That’s Smarter Than We Are,” Washington Post, July 22, 2019.
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Finally, in this period of open technological innovation, we
must move beyond the military-civilian firewall in our defense
institutions. For example, we must find a way to permit unorthodox
talent to move horizontally in and out of US military service without
penalty. The current career path of selecting and promoting officers
is anachronistic and fails to provide the range of experience our
military leaders need. If Army Futures Command, for example, is
staffed strictly by lifelong government servants and Army officers
who never experience working at a start-up, developing a cuttingedge technology, or engaging in entrepreneurial risk-taking (and
even failure), it will lack the skills to work effectively with the tech
sector. That will make it impossible to identify the most promising
commercially driven technologies, build forward-leaning operational
doctrine, and capitalize upon evolving military capabilities in
military contests.35
From the commercial side, notwithstanding Google employees’
2018 protests against the Department of Defense’s Project Maven, the
problem is not inherently cultural. A Ronald Reagan Institute survey
indicates 53 percent of those under 29 still have “great confidence” in
the military, and more Americans have confidence in military officers
(59 percent) than in doctors (54 percent), teachers (52 percent) or
clergymen (25 percent).36 Young people seem as favorably disposed
toward intelligence and national security as they ever were, and they
have tremendous confidence in the military as the most trusted and
effective American institution.
But those who are trained and driven to innovate in cutting-edge
twenty-first-century technologies fear industrial-era bureaucracies,
and there is little evidence to convince them otherwise. 37 Furloughs
of highly trained government professionals only make things worse.
Obtaining a US government contract is difficult, risky, expensive, and
time-consuming, and the system is heavily weighted toward existing
players who know how to access and navigate this byzantine system.
Most tech start-ups cannot survive the process. For people with
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-charts-112918.pdf.
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creative new ideas, commercial markets offer better opportunities
for developing and implementing them at scale and speed.38
Periods of open technological innovation contain exciting
potential, but also widespread societal instability, and military
organizations have and will continue to be forced to respond. To
understand how best to engage opportunities and minimize risks,
we cannot merely consider how new technologies might be employed
on the battlefield; they affect societies in uncontested environments
first. Failing to appreciate the broader social context of technological
innovation by private and public actors and across a broad swathe
of political and economic sectors leaves us unprepared for how the
next war will actually unfold. And relying on the wrong models of
innovation, developed for a different technological context, yields
outmoded strategy and doctrine. Technological surprise is inevitable
now; it must be built into US planning. Rather than try to wrest
control of the chaotic process of open technological innovation,
the US government should better inspire and incentivize today’s
whiz kids—the Nobels, Marconis, and Wright Brothers of the
twenty-first century—to channel their creative energies to serve
American interests.
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